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Q41This paper investigates the effects of behavioural interventions on energy conservation in naturally ventilated
ofﬁces. Our aim is to inform buildingmanagers, environmental consultants, and social scientists on the effective-
ness of low-cost, easy-to-implement interventions aimed at reducing energy waste and carbon emissions in a
settingwhere individuals do not have direct ﬁnancial gain and have low awareness of the environmental impact
of their actions. The interventions consist of three types of emails with different information content aimed at
encouraging recipients not to leave the windows of their ofﬁce open overnight or during weekends. Our results
show that these interventions are effective in promoting energy savings, as the percentage of windows left open
by treated occupants is typically halved compared to a control group.We ﬁnd that the impact of the treatment is
strongerwhenwe provide speciﬁc information about the energywaste of the buildingwhere the email recipients
work or when we show them how their behaviour differs from that of their peers. Moreover, our results show
that positive behavioural changes are still observed a few weeks after the interventions are terminated, thus
suggesting that such interventions do not act only as temporary “cues”which are easily forgotten by recipients.
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Keywords:
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Naturally ventilated ofﬁce1. Introduction
Market-based policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions such as
carbon cap-and-trade programs or subsidies to renewable energies
have proved to be very effective.1 However, the political resistance to
the use of some of these approaches (as in the case of the market for
trading carbon emissions in the US) and the ﬁnancial cost involved in
sustaining them (as in the case of the subsidies for solar and wind
energy) have pushed in recent years, academics and policy makers tocellent research assistance and
or useful comments. This work
ces Research Council, UK [EP/
Emission Trading System (ETS)
vered by the system by around
20, emissions from sectors cov-
ee https://ec.europa.eu/clima/
. This is an open access article undershift their attention to alternative low-cost, non-price-based energy
conservation programs (see Allcott and Mullainhatan (2010) and
Dietz et al. (2009) among others).
A large body of ongoing research on consumption feedback, appeals
to environmental protection, and social comparisons has shown that be-
havioural interventions can be cost-effective in encouraging households
to conserve energy (Abrahamse et al. (2005); Allcott and Mullainhatan
(2010)). For instance, in an inﬂuential study based on data from a ran-
domized experiment involving thousands of US households, Allcott
(2011) ﬁnds that Home-Energy-Report letters comparing the electricity
bill of residential customers to that of their neighbours induce a 2% reduc-
tion in energy consumption.
Building upon these ﬁndings, the aim of this paper is to evaluate the
effectiveness of a simple energy conservation intervention in the
context of naturally ventilated ofﬁcebuildings, namely to remindpartic-
ipants to close the windows before leaving the ofﬁce. Non-domestic
buildings in UK are responsible for one quarter of the total emissions
attributed to residential and non-residential buildings (which together
represents around 18% of UK's CO2 emissions) but, whereas emissions
from residential buildings have gradually decreased over the lastthe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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the period 2007–2015 (Committee on Climate Change, 2016). This
trend could be reversed if occupants were using building systems and
controls more effectively. Several studies (Leaman and Bordass (2001)
and Clements-Croome (2006), among others) have shown that people
favour ofﬁce spaces where they can interact with the facade to regulate
their indoor environment. But this ability to individually change the
internal environmental conditions does bear a risk of compromising
the energy performance of the building as occupants are often oblivious
to the necessity of minimizing energy use, especially in the absence of
any direct costs as employees do not pay for the energy bills.
Behavioural interventions aimed at promoting energy conservation,
such the OPOWER program studied by Allcott (2011), while non-price-
based, do imply aﬁnancial gain for the subjects. It can be argued that the
impact of social norms and pro-environment feedback may not be
equally effective in a context where people receive no direct ﬁnancial
beneﬁts. The ﬁndings from the literature on the impact of behavioural
interventions in non-domestic buildings suggest that eco-feedback can
be effective in encouraging energy conservation even in the absence of
direct ﬁnancial gains for participants.2 However, existing studies on
energy conservation in the workplace are scant; the effectiveness of
the interventions is almost always measured in terms of aggregate
electricity usage at the building level. In addition, little is known about
the long-term effects of these interventions as employees' behaviour
is generally not monitored over longer periods.3
Insights from psychology literature suggest that promoting behav-
ioural change is more effective when the behaviour to be changed is
carefully selected, interventions are well-tuned and not too costly to
implement and feedback makes salient the relationship between one's
action and a given outcome (Abrahamse et al., 2005; Steg and Vlek,
2009). In this respect, Carrico and Riemer (2011) note that “feedback
that is removed from the speciﬁc behaviour, either temporally or in unit
of analysis (i.e. aggregated across many behaviours and/or individuals)
will not provide the type of information that allows an individual to
gauge whether his or her actions are having the desired effect”. Building
upon these ﬁndings, the key contribution of our research is to investi-
gate the effectiveness of environment appeals and social norms in the
workplace in a setting where (a) the intervention refers to a single
task, simple and easy to implement (i.e. close the window of your
ofﬁce), (b) feedback is at individual level and delivered at relatively
high frequency (two emails a week) and (c) the link between the
behaviour to be changed and the impact on energy consumption is
less obvious.4 Moreover, as we monitor the behaviour of our subjects
from two to seven weeks after the interventions have been
discontinued, our study can shed light on the “medium-term” effects
of our energy conservation program.
Our approach builds on a multi-disciplinary project (Bourikas et al.,
2016), and it involved the development of a bespoke software system
to monitor the status of windows starting from photos of the façade
and which allowed the semi-automatic dispatch of emails (sent twice
a week) to the individual in control of the windows, based on each
window's status. Three types of intervention were deﬁned around
these emails, and they were designed based on insights from psychol-
ogy science on the importance of moral obligations and social norms
on behaviour (Steg and Vlek, 2009). The ﬁrst intervention involved a
generic email informing recipients about the problem of energy waste2 See the papers by Carrico and Riemer (2011), Gulbinas and Taylor (2014) and Dixon
et al. (2015) discussed in the literature review.
3 As noted by Abrahamse et al. (2005), most studies do not monitor energy usage after
interventions have been discontinued and, consequently, it is difﬁcult to know whether
“behavioural changesweremaintained andwhether new (energy-saving) habits were formed,
or whether energy use returned to baseline levels”.
4 In a survey we conducted one year before the beginning of this study, we found that
the vast majority of the respondents did not associate wasting heat with energy waste
(Bourikas et al., 2016). Abrahamse et al. (2005) note that “educational campaigns may es-
pecially be advisable when people are unaware of energy use and environmental problems”.due to windows being left open overnight. The second intervention
involved a feedback email informing recipients about the average
number of windows left open in their building. Finally, the third
intervention involved an email based on social norms, which informed
recipients about how many times they have left their ofﬁce window
open compared to others in their building. Our interest in comparing
these three options is to examine whether tailored information speciﬁc
to the working environment of the recipients and social norms, which
have been found to be potent behavioural drivers in experimental
settings (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004), are conﬁrmed to be a more
powerful motivator of prosocial behaviour than a simple appeal to
energy conservation also in a real context where subjects do not have
direct ﬁnancial gains. The three interventionswere compared to a base-
line period, before the interventions started, and to the performance of a
group of participants who had their windows monitored, but did not
receive any emails.
The results, detailed in Section 4, indicate that the interventions are
effective in encouraging energy conservation and that the impact of the
treatment is stronger when feedback and normative comparisons are
included. We also found some evidence that our interventions may
facilitate the formation of an energy conservation culture as the positive
effects of the intervention are still observed someweeks after the inter-
ventions are terminated. Back-of-the envelope calculations suggest that
these types of intervention have the potential to lead to annual savings
of more than £40,000 over a bill of £3.5million on gas alone for an insti-
tution such as the University of Southampton.5
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
existing literature on non-price interventions. Section 3 ﬁrst explains
the type and timing of the interventions and then provides information
about the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 details the
empirical speciﬁcation used to investigate the effects of the interven-
tions and the results obtained. Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature review
This study sits in between different strands of literature. Research in
economics and psychology has mainly focused on the effects of behav-
ioural interventions on energy conservation in a domestic setting. The
resulting literature has shown that social norms including feedback,
energy conservation tips, or household energy reports comparing
their energy usage to that of neighbours, can have substantial effects
on reducing energy consumption, at least in the short-term (Allcott
and Mullainathan, 2010 among others). Allcott and Rogers (2014)
show that if interventions are sustained over time, individuals build a
“capital stock” which eventually allows altered behaviours to become
natural ones and thus to persist over time.6 The study by Asensio and
Delmas (2015) compares the efﬁcacy of price and non-price interven-
tions. The authors ﬁnd that providing feedback of the negative effects
of energy use on the environment and human-health (e.g. pollution or
child asthma) outperform monetary incentives to drive energy
conservation.
Arguably, the extent to which information affects behaviour
depends on the precision of the feedback provided. Nolan et al. (2008)
ﬁnd that messages notifying how neighbours engage with energy
conservation are more effective in spurring behavioural changes than
those encouraging standard appeals to the environment. Agarwal et al.
(2017) also conﬁrms that peers' comparisons have substantial inﬂuence
on consumers' behaviour. They ﬁnd that school children nudging their
families to conform to efﬁcient energy habits are an effective way of or-
ganizing “voluntary commitments” resulting in a 1.8% drop in house-
hold energy use. These simple experiments show how social norms5 University of Southampton (UoS) Carbon management Plan, 2011
6 In a study on the effects of construction activities on residential electricity consump-
tion, Agarwal et al. (2016) ﬁnd evidence of persistent increase in electricity usage trigger
by a temporary negative environmental externality.
Table 1
Ofﬁces in the treated and untreated group and occupancy number proﬁle.
Part A Part B
Building Treated Untreated Occupancy Ofﬁces
1 53 27 1 111
2 & 3 35 23 2 26
4 13 6 3 33
5 – 28 N3 15
Total ofﬁces 101 84 Total ofﬁces 185
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peer behaviour is presented. Although most studies proved the efﬁcacy
of non-price interventions, Costa and Kahn (2013) point out that a
major pitfall resulting from this type of mediations is a “rebound effect”,
that is a possible increase in usage when consumers are told to be
under-consuming energy compared to their neighbours.
A limited number of studies have investigated the effectiveness of
behavioural intervention on energy conservation in non-residential
buildings. Masoso and Grobler (2010), in a study of commercial build-
ings in Botswana and South Africa, ﬁnd that 56% of energy usage occurs
during non-working hours mainly because occupants leave lights and
equipment on at the end of the day. Because occupants do not bear
the ﬁnancial cost of energy, price intervention would be ineffective in
shifting individuals' consumption towards more energy-efﬁcient
outcomes, thus making behavioural intervention more relevant. On
this matter, Gulbinas and Taylor (2014) ﬁnd that providing energy-
use information of colleagues within an organization can result in
greater energy savings than individual feedback and Dixon et al.
(2015) ﬁnd that comparative feedback within a university reduces
energy consumption by 6.5%. Similarly, Carrico and Riemer (2011)
estimate that group-level feedback and peer education resulted in
respectively, 7% and 4% reduction in the energy used in a workplace.
While all the studies above focus on electricity consumption, it is
reasonable to assume that similar results would be obtained in other
contexts, such as water usage and space heating. Cialdini et al. (2008),
in a study on towel reuse among hotel guests, ﬁnd that appeals stating
that the majority of hotel guests reuse towels proved a more effective
intervention than a general appeal to the environment. Ferraro et al.
(2011) show that technical advice alone does not encourage water
conservation, but it is effectivewhen the former is combinedwith social
comparisons. Likewise, Brown et al. (2013) ﬁnd that reducing the
default option of thermostat by 1 °C is an effectiveway to combat excess
heating.
In essence, previous studies show that non-price interventions not
only spur behavioural changes stimulated by peers' attitudes, confor-
mity, feeling of guilt and responsibility but they also help ﬁlling in the
gaps when the lack of knowledge itself is the driving force of resources
overuse.7 A thorough ethics assessment was undertaken prior to any work and researchers had
visited the occupants of these buildings several weeks before starting monitoring the fa-
cade in order to distribute participant information sheets, discuss any concerns and enroll
the ofﬁce occupants to the study. The participant information sheet had generic informa-
tion about the aims of the study and the activities to be undertaken. All the participants
haveprovidedwritten consent for having thewindows' statusmonitored and/or receiving
the intervention emails.
8 In case of a shared space, an ofﬁce is part of the treated group only if respectively, all
the occupants have agreed to have their windowsmonitored and at least one of the occu-
pants has also agreed to be contacted by email.3. Data and variables
3.1. Building and ofﬁces
Five naturally ventilated (i.e space heating, natural ventilation, no
cooling) ofﬁce buildings at the University of Southampton were moni-
tored during the 2016/2017 heating season with a bespoke camera
based system that identiﬁes the status “open/close” of the windows
(for more information we refer to the companion paper by Bourikas
et al., 2016). Based on the camera analysis status, emails were automat-
ically sent to the ofﬁce occupants who were in control of the identiﬁed
windows. The emails aimed at drawing the occupants' attention to the
problem of poor window management.
The ﬁve studied buildings include a combination of individual
ofﬁces, shared ofﬁce space and some small lecture/meeting rooms
(not included in the interventions). They have top-pivot windows that
can be manually operated by occupants and they are all connected to
the University district heating scheme. The heating system is a high
temperature hot water distribution (N65 °C) that runs along the outer
wall of the buildings with radiators in the ofﬁces to distribute the heat
in the space. Originally the radiators were boxed in panels and heat in
ofﬁces was managed with ﬂaps on the box that would allow air to
ﬂow or to close it. The only thing that has really changed since 1960's
is that these ﬂaps no longer work and there is no way to isolate the
heating system of individual ofﬁces. Inaccessible and ineffective heating
control in the ofﬁces exacerbates poor window behaviour as occupantsfeel that their only option to reduce excess overheating is to open a
window.
Building 1 was built in 1975. It has a square ﬂoor plan with an
internal courtyard. Participants were randomly distributed across all
the 4 sides of the building and they all had access to windows looking
outwards onto the building surroundings and not to the courtyard.
This building had the largest number of participants with 80 ofﬁces
monitored. Buildings 2 & 3 were both built in the 1960's and they
have similar construction properties to Building 1. Their main facades
have a Southeast-Northwest orientation, the windows are steel framed
with single glazing and ﬁtted with internal venetian blinds. Buildings 2
& 3 are part of the same phase of the intervention (i.e. receive the same
emails simultaneously) and the results are combined in the analysis. In
these buildings there was a total of 58 ofﬁces monitored. Building 4 was
also built in the 1960's and it has similar characteristics to the rest of the
studied buildings. However, there is a big difference to the ﬂoor plan
layout because a large part is used for labs and views to some parts of
the facade are blocked by vegetation. In Building 4 there were 19 ofﬁces
monitored with 33 participants in the intervention. Lastly, Building 5
was built in the 1960 and it also has steel framed single glazedwindows.
In this building there were 28 ofﬁces monitored.
To comply with ethic rules, all participants in the study consented to
have the status of their windows monitored. Treated units are the
occupants that also agreed to receive our email interventions.7 To
increase participation rate, we repeatedly visited the occupants of the
selected buildings in order to distribute/collect ethics forms and answer
enquiries. The decision of taking part in the study and, in addition,
agreeing to receive an email notiﬁcation was often taken after this
short meeting and it can reasonably assumed to be orthogonal to the
inclination to close the windows before leaving the ofﬁce, which is the
behavioural changewe aimed to affect. Indeed, the analysis of the status
of the windows during the pre-intervention period shows that on aver-
age the probability of leaving awindowopen is not statistically different
between participants that agreed to receive emails (i.e. treated units)
and the participants that only agreed to have their windows monitored
(i.e. untreated units).
Part A of Table 1 shows that the sample used in the empirical
analysis of the intervention results includes 185 ofﬁces. Occupants of
101 of these ofﬁces are part of the treated group.8 For each ofﬁce we
have 64 observations: 20 observations during the pre-intervention
phase (corresponding to the working days from Friday 29th of
September to Thursday 27th of October 2016), 37 observations during
the intervention period (working days from Friday 28th of October to
Monday 19th of December 2016 included) and 7 observations for
January 2017. Part B of Table 1 shows that 111 of the 185 ofﬁces were
Fig. 1. Pictures of the monitored building facades at the University of Southampton.
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were shared bymore than two persons (these spaces are typically occu-
pied by PhD students or administration staff) and ﬁnally 15 were public
shared spaces, including visitors' room, and small meeting/teaching
rooms. In addition, we note that the windows in 68 of the 185 ofﬁces
are always closed (39 ofﬁces in the treated group and 29 ofﬁces in the
untreated group) while none of the ofﬁces was found to have their
windows always open during our study.
Given that the number of untreated control units is lower than the
number of treated units, we construct three control groups with the
same number of ofﬁces as the treated groups (e.g. 53 control ofﬁces
for the 53 treated ofﬁces in Building 1) by sampling (with repetition)
from the pool of 84 untreated units located in any of the buildings
(including Building 5).More precisely, for each treated ofﬁce i, we select
a control ofﬁce j that closely matches the number of the times the
windows of ofﬁce i have been left open in the pre-intervention period
(see Section 3.3 below for statistical evidence on the quality of the
match).93.2. Behavioural intervention
Our behavioural intervention consists of sending one of three differ-
ent types of emails to participants that agreed to be contacted by our
team.10 Guided by insights from behavioural science, we drafted three
emails with different information content with the aim of motivating
receivers to save energy by closing the ofﬁcewindowswhen the heating
system is on operation.9 Using the same number of treated and control units increases the precision of the es-
timates, in particular for building 4 where the number of monitored ofﬁces is particularly
small. All but two of the treated units arematched to an untreated unitwhich left thewin-
dows open exactly the same number of times during the pre-intervention period. For the
two treated units for which we could not ﬁnd a “perfect”match, we selected an untreated
unit with the closest number of windows left open. Our approach is similar in principle
with themethodology proposed by Abadie et al. (2010), which has been extensively used
in settings where the number of untreated control units is small and therefore they may
not provide by themselves a perfect comparison for the treatment group.
10 All emails were sent from a purposively created university account. Participants could
send their emails to this mail account if they needed information or if they wanted to be
removed from the study. Only 4 participants asked to be removed from the mailing list.
We do not know whether the emails were read. On this point, we note that if similar in-
terventions were deployed in other institutions, we would expect some participants to
open and read emails and other disregard them. In that respect, there are no reasons to be-
lieve that the attitude of our subjects is different from the attitude we may encounter in
another working environment. By selecting only the people that read all the emails, we
would over-estimate the impact of our intervention.Theﬁrst email, whichwewill refer to asGeneralMail (GM), informed
the recipients about the problemof energywaste due towindows being
left open overnight in non-residential buildings, and its implication for
the environment and the energy bill paid by the institution where
they work. The second and the third emails also appealed to the envi-
ronment and economic beneﬁts of closing the windows but included
additional speciﬁc information more relevant to the recipients. The sec-
ond email, which we refer to as Local Mail (LM), gave the occupants
feedback on the average number of windows left open in the building
they work. The third email, which we refer to as Personalised Mail
(PM), tried to appeal to social norms by informing the recipients on
how many times they have left their ofﬁce window open compared to
other occupants of the same building. A copy of these emails is shown
in Fig. 2.
These three emails aim to pull at different motivational strings. All
the emails appeal to the environmental motivation by informing the
participants of the importance of closing thewindows for the reduction
of heatwaste and consequent greenhouse gas emissions. The LMaims at
assessing whether behavioural interventions are more effective when
describing the behaviour of a group with whom the participants share
similar characteristics and that they can relate to (see Goldstein et al.
(2008) among others). This is achieved by replacing the somehow
abstract problem of energywaste in non-residential buildings with pre-
cise information on the number of windows left open in the building
where recipientswork. Finally, the PM tries to evaluate the effectiveness
of social comparison in the absence of ﬁnancial incentives by appealing
to feelings of guilt (reward) for individuals that behave worse (better)
than their colleagues.
Responses to an online questionnaire which we sent in September
2015 to a random sample of people that work in ofﬁce buildings in
the UK (see the companion paper by Bourikas et al. (2016) for full
details), show that the vast majority of the respondents did not associ-
ate wasting heat behaviourwith energywaste.11 This is also the case for
individuals that considered themselves as highly motivated towards
environmental protection. The fact that people seem more inclined to
save electricity but not heat suggests that informing and remindingpeo-
ple about the negative effect of poor window management can have a
substantial impact on energy conservation in a non-domestic building.11 Out of the 91 valid questionnaire responses, N70% of the respondents considered
“leaving the lights on” a wasteful behaviour but b30% had the same view about “leaving
the windows open”. The responses showed that the reasons for closing a window are
mainly due to environmental inﬂuences (e.g. temperature, rain, noise) while energy
seems to be a weak driver in this respect.
Fig. 2. Samples of intervention emails.
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a general appeal to the problem of energy waste and contained the
same stylized picture of a building to avoid bias in the way the informa-
tion is conveyed. In the case of a GM, the picture always had one of ten
windows coloured in red to represent the average percentage of
windows left open overnight (see Fig. 2A).
Besides raising awareness about the environment and ﬁnancial
impact (for the University of Southampton) of leaving windows open,the LM also reported speciﬁc information about the percentage of
windows left open in the building where each recipient works and
whether this percentage was higher or lower compared to what had
been observed in the previous period: “You may be interested to
know that in YOUR building, 7% of the monitored windows were left
open over the last weekend, compared to 10% over the previous week-
end.”Weuse the same stylized image of a building using a red colour to
represent the percentages of windows left open (see Fig. 2B). With this
587C. Ornaghi et al. / Energy Economics 74 (2018) 582–591second type of email, we sought to assess whether there is a stronger
drive to energy conservation if the problem of energy waste is
presented in a context that is relevant to the recipients and, at the
same time, participants are informed about the progress (or lack of it)
of the intervention over time. Note that emails sent out on Fridays
(respectively, Mondays) reported information on the status of the
windows for the nights from Monday to Thursday (respectively, for
the weekend).
Our third email reported information about the behaviour of each
recipient compared to the other occupants of the same building: “You
may be interested to know that our software has found that last
weekend your window has not been left open between Friday and
Sunday, in comparison overall 11 windows were left open (5%) by all
monitored occupants of YOUR building.” (see Fig. 2C). This PM tries to
strike the chord of personal reward (or shame) when people learn
that they are doing better (worse) than their peers as far as this speciﬁc
energy conservation program is concerned.
The different phases of our behavioural intervention are shown in
Fig. 3. The state of the buildings' windows was monitored during
working days from Friday 30th of September 2016 until Thursday
12th of January 2017, excluding 12 days during the Christmas
break (from Tuesday 20th of December 2016 to Monday 2nd of
January).12 On Friday 28th of October, occupants in the treated
group started receiving two emails a week, every Friday at 15:00
and every Monday at 10:00. For instance, occupants of Building 1
were sent six GM, followed by six LMs and four PMs. We also moni-
tored the state of the windows for seven working days in the ﬁrst
half of January 2017 in order to evaluate the persistence of the im-
pact of the interventions. Note that the notation used in the legend
of Fig. 3 to describe the different phases of our study (i.e. PRE, GM,
LM, PM and POST) will be used also in the regression model of
Section 4.
As mentioned in the Introduction, this intervention conﬁguration
enabled our team to investigate whether tailored information speciﬁc
to the working environment of the recipients and social norms are a
more powerful motivator of prosocial behaviour than a simple appeal
to energy conservation for environmental protection. At the same
time, the follow-up monitoring of the windows after interventions are
terminated made it possible to assess whether pro-environmental
habits are short-lived or tend to be maintained over the following
weeks.13 Following Allcott and Rogers (2014), an intervention can be
considered as a way to provide either information or a “cue”. In the
ﬁrst case, as the intervention is repeated, people gradually develop
new habits that generates persistent changes in outcomes. Accordingly,
we would expect to ﬁnd that the numbers of windows left open in Jan-
uary is still lower for the treated group than the control and also that the
energy conservation attitude is stronger for participants that have been
exposed to the intervention for a longer period. Alternatively, if the
treatment acts as a temporary “cue” that reminds occupants to close
the windows when leaving the ofﬁce, the behaviour of the treated peo-
ple is likely to converge quickly to that of the control group as the recip-
ients forget about the message once the intervention has been
discontinued.3.3. Windows status
Our unit of observation is an ofﬁce, not awindow. The reason for this
is that if any of the windows are left open overnight energy is wasted12 Friday 16th of December was the last day of teaching before the Christmas break.
13 We assume that January can be used to assesswhether effects are short-lived because,
for Buildings 2 & 3 and Building 4, the intervention ends several days before the New Year
and,more importantly, Christmasholidays give the opportunity to all occupants to discon-
nect from their working environment and forget about our messages.and it is then reasonable to assume that our intervention has a positive
effect only when occupants close all the windows under their control.
Accordingly, an ofﬁce is classiﬁed as “open” (respectively, “closed”)
overnight if our system detects that at least one of its windows (none
of its windows) is open at around 18:00 pm on that day and it is still
open at around 08:00 am the following day. The status of an ofﬁce is
observed ﬁve days a week, from Monday to Friday. The “open/close”
status for the weekends is deﬁned using the information on Friday
evening and the following Monday morning. We acknowledge that
our approach may lead to a wrong classiﬁcation if, for instance,
occupants arrive in their ofﬁce (and interactwith theirwindows) before
we check the status of the window. However, we do not think that this
represents a major problem because both academic and administrative
staff typically start working around 9 am, as inmost UK universities and
companies. More importantly, there is no reason to believe that the
intervention and control groups are affected in different ways by this
type of measurement error.
To detect the status of a window, photographs of the facades were
taken and analysed by the bespoke software mentioned above. The
detailed window detection methodology and technical speciﬁca-
tions of the system and its function are described in a previous
publication (Bourikas et al. (2016)). While the software is designed
to automatically detect the status of windows, the data used for the
interventions reported in this paper was manually veriﬁed by the re-
searchers, not only to avoid inaccuracies, but also to collect a so-
called ground-truth dataset needed to calibrate the automatic detec-
tion processes.
To have a preliminary understanding of how the facade interac-
tion evolves over time, Fig. 4 shows the percentage of ofﬁces left
open for treated units (red line) and control units (blue line) for
the three different treatment schedules separately and ALL together.
The vertical lines indicate the beginning of an intervention. As in Fig.
3, we use orange, yellow and red to indicate that occupants in the
treated groups are sent respectively, a GM, a LM or a PM (for ALL,
we use a black line as the intervention varies across buildings). As
mentioned in Section 3.1 above, control units have been selected
by sampling (with repetition) from any of the 84 untreated ofﬁces
(including those located in Building 5) so that each treated unit is
matched to the untreated unit that shows a very similar behaviour
during the pre-intervention period.
The vertical lines indicate thebeginning of an intervention. As in Fig. 3,
we use orange, yellow and red to indicate that occupants in the treated
groups are sent respectively, a GM, a LM or a PM (for ALL, we use a
black line as the intervention varies across buildings). Visual inspection
of the four panels suggests that treated and control groups indeed share
very similar patterns during the pre-intervention period. Moreover, t-
tests on the equality of means during the pre-intervention fail to reject
the null hypothesis that the percentage of windows left open in treated
and control groups are the same for the three sets of buildings individu-
ally and all together.14
The top-right picture of Fig. 4 shows a signiﬁcant departure between
the two lines after the beginning of the intervention on the 28th of
October 2016. The red line (intervention group) lies beneath the blue
line (control group) for most of the following days, including those in
January 2017. Looking at all the buildings, we ﬁnd that a similar pattern
is evident in Building 1 and in Buildings 2 & 3. Finally, the pattern in
Building 4 is more difﬁcult to interpret because the percentage of
“open-windows” ofﬁces in the treated and control groups is subject to
large variations over time. This is not surprising if we consider that
the number of ofﬁces monitored in Building 4 is small.14 The p-value of the two-tail tests of the null hypothesis that the difference in means is
zero vs the alternative hypothesis that the difference inmeans is different than zero is 0.9
or higher for all the four cases reported in Figure 1.
Fig. 3. Timing of interventions across the buildings in our study.
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To assess the impact of our behavioural interventions on the
percentage of ofﬁce with windows left open overnights, we use the
following regression model:
Wi;t ¼
X
j
α jP j þ
X
j
β jP jT þ Xδþ ui;t ð1Þ
where Wi, t indicates the percentage of ofﬁce with open windows in
Building i on the night of day t andGreek letters are coefﬁcients to be es-
timated. The variable Pj refers to one of theﬁve phases of the programas
shown in Fig. 3, with j= {PRE, GM, LM, PM, POST}, and T is an indicator
for the treatment group. Accordingly, the coefﬁcients αj measure the
percentage of windows left open during phase j in the control group
while coefﬁcients βj indicate whether the percentage of open windows
is higher or lower in the treated group.15 If our behavioural interven-
tions are effective in encouraging energy savings behaviour, we expect
the coefﬁcients βj (excluding βPRE) to take statistically signiﬁcant nega-
tive values. As different types of intervention are implemented across
buildings, the functional form of specifation (1) is also different for the
three sets of buildings. For instance, for Building 4, we can only estimate
threeαj (namely,αPRE,αPMandαPOST) and threeβj (namely,βPRE,βPMand
βPOST) while all ﬁve αj and βj can be estimated for Building 1.
Speciﬁcation (1) is estimated using ordinary least-square (OLS) re-
gression, with robust standard errors. Estimated coefﬁcients for the
three sets of buildings are reported in Table 2. Whereas the number of
observations is the same across the three speciﬁcations, recall that the
number of treated and control units used to compute the percentage
of windows open at each point in time is higher in Building 1 than the
other buildings. As explained above, the α coefﬁcients capture the
evolution of the windows left open over time in the control group. For
instance, for Building 1, around 14% of the windows in the control
group are left open during the pre-intervention period. This percentage
increases to 21% during the GM phase (which, in the case of Building 1,
corresponds to the days from the 28th of October to the 18th of
November) and then it constantly decreases over the following weeks
until we observe a 8% of open windows in the post-intervention period
(which corresponds to the 7 observations of January 2017).15 Our time-phase dummies P capture any “exogenous” event that can affect a change in
behaviour of all subjects over time, for instance changes inweather (e.g. a drop in the tem-
perature) that make people more likely to close their windows.A number of interesting ﬁndings emerge from the estimates of the β
coefﬁcients. First, the estimates of βPRE are very close to zero and not
statistically signiﬁcant for all the three buildings, which conﬁrms that
the behaviour of treated and control units are (almost) identical during
the pre-intervention period. Second, all the estimates of βGM, βLM and
βPM are negative and statistically signiﬁcant, thus giving strong support
to the idea that there is a substantial reduction in the numbers of
windows left open in the treated group compared to the control group
during the intervention period. Third, the fact that the estimates of
βPOST are also negative suggests that the impact of our interventions
continues after the intervention have stopped. Particularly interesting
is the coefﬁcient of βPOST for Building 1, which refers to the January
data. Christmas holidays represent an important break from the work
environment during which treated occupants are likely to forget about
the intervention. Accordingly, if the treatment acts only as “cue” that
draws the attention to energy waste but does not create a permanent
“capital stock”, we should not ﬁnd any difference in the percentage of
“open-windows” ofﬁce in January. Starting from a base-line of 7% of
windows left open in the control group, we observe a reduction for
the treated group to 4.9% of windows left open. These numbers show
that some of the pro-environmental behavioural changes observed
during the intervention period are maintained after we stop sending
out mails, thus suggesting that our interventions may have facilitated
the formation of new (energy-saving) habits.
In order to test whether there are signiﬁcant differences among our
three types of emails, Table 3 shows how the effectiveness of our
interventions changes from one phase to the following one, together
with the p-value of a non-linear Walt test for the null hypothesis that
the change is not statistically different from zero. To compute the
“incremental” effects of our interventions, we need to take into account
the percentage of open windows in the control group during the
different phases of our study. For instance, the ﬁrst value in Column
(1) is computed using the α and β coefﬁcients in Table 2 as follows:
βGM
αGM
−
βPRE
αPRE
¼−0:088
0:207
−
−0:00
0:137
¼−0:424
The numbers reported in column (1) suggest that the percentage
of windows left open in the treated group is substantially lower
compared to the control group across all the buildings, with an ag-
gregate reduction of around 40% in Building 2 & 3, 50% in Building
4 and 70% in Building 1. Considering that the number of treated
units in Building 1 is more than the other buildings, we can assume
that a reduction of 50% in the number of windows left open can be
16 Note that this estimate is based on the case of theUniversity of SouthamptonHighﬁeld
campus where heating is provided by a combined heat and power (CHP) generation sys-
tem. In the business as usual case of using condensing gas boilerswith an efﬁciency of 90%,
the extra cost would be £21,000 per year more than the CHP case (£105,000 in the gas
boiler case compared with £84,000 in the CHP case) and the increase in emissions would
be 6 tCO2 less than the CHP case (277tCO2 increase in emissions from the condensing
boilers compared with 283tCO2 increase in the case of a CHP system). That shows that
in the current ﬁnancial environment the CHP systems may offer cost avoidance opportu-
nities but the carbon emissions are comparable with the “traditional” heating systems.
Fig. 4. Number of the windows left open in treated and control group.
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mented in this study.
Our results show that the impact of LM is stronger than GM for
treated ofﬁces in Building 1, while we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that the impact of LM is the same as the impact of PM for both Building 1
and Building 2 & 3. These conﬁrm previous ﬁndings that feedback about
relative performance may be helpful in promoting pro-environmental
behaviour when important or relevant others are used as reference
group (Abrahamse et al., 2005). At the same time, the fact that LM and
PM are not statistically different suggests that the feeling of competition
and social comparison that is evoked by PM seems to be equally
effective in promotive virtuous behaviour than the social pressure that
may be installed by PM. Finally, the fact that there are no statistical
differences between the “LM” and “POST” shows that the pro-
environmental behaviour observed during the intervention period
does not fade after interventions are terminated, even in the case of a
relative short treatment as the one applied to ofﬁces in Building 4.
To sum up, the results presented in Tables 2 and 3 show that:
(i) All our interventions are effective in encouraging energy savings.
(ii) Providing precise information about energy waste in the environ-
ment where the occupants work (LM) or comparing the behaviour of
recipients to their peers (PM) provides greater incentives to reduce
energy waste than a generic appeal (GM) to the environmental and
ﬁnancial beneﬁts of closing the windows. (iii) We ﬁnd positive effects
even after the interventions are discontinued. This suggests that our
treatments do not only act as a temporary “cue” that is easily forgot-
ten but they may contribute to the creation of pro-environmentalhabits. In terms of magnitude, we ﬁnd that the percentage of win-
dows left open has generally halved.
The numbers above can be used to calculate the ﬁnancial savings
and environmental beneﬁts of our interventions. Obviously this calcula-
tion needs to be treated with caution given the small scale of our inter-
ventions. In our previous work we show that leaving windows open
during out-of-work hours at the buildings used in this study can
account for around 10% of the annual heating load (Bourikas et al.
2016). If this estimation were to be generalized to the total number of
university buildings, the 10% of the total heating energy use (estimated
average total of 212kWh/m2 from DEC data, 10% of the total is
~21 kWh/m2) can be translated into an additional cost of £85,000 per
year for heating and an additional 285 tCO2 emissions due to the
heating use increase,16 equivalent emissions to driving a medium
sized car for 1.3 million miles. Therefore, implementing an intervention
that can halve the number of windows left open would translate into
cost avoidance of £43,000 per year from the heating bills and a reduc-
tion of 142 tCO2 in the associated emissions. This represents fairly big
Table 2
Impact of email interventions on percentage of windows left “open”.
Variable Coefﬁcient Bld 1 Bld 2 & 3 Bld 4
(1) (2) (3)
TPRE αPRE 0.139⁎⁎⁎ 0.244⁎⁎⁎ 0.212⁎⁎⁎
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
TGM αGM 0.208⁎⁎⁎ – –
(0.02)
TLM αLM 0.190⁎⁎⁎ 0.234⁎⁎⁎ –
(0.02) (0.01)
TPM αPM 0.140⁎⁎⁎ 0.211⁎⁎⁎ 0.349⁎⁎⁎
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
TPOST αPS 0.070⁎⁎⁎ 0.157⁎⁎⁎ 0.183⁎⁎⁎
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
TPRE⁎I βPRE −0.000 0.003 −0.000
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
TGM⁎I βGM −0.088⁎⁎⁎ – –
(0.02)
TLM⁎I βLM −0.135⁎⁎⁎ −0.078⁎⁎⁎ –
(0.02) (0.02)
TPM⁎I βPM −0.092⁎⁎⁎ −0.090⁎⁎⁎ −0.174⁎⁎⁎
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
TPOST⁎I βPS −0.049⁎⁎⁎ −0.073⁎⁎⁎ −0.090⁎⁎⁎
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Obs 128 128 128
R-squared 0.851 0.9 0.733
Robust standard error in parenthesis ⁎⁎⁎p b 0.01, ⁎⁎p b 0.05,⁎p b 0.10.
590 C. Ornaghi et al. / Energy Economics 74 (2018) 582–591savings considering that our intervention is easy and not expensive to
implement.
5. Conclusions
According to ﬁgures published by the UK Committee on Climate
Change (2016), emissions in non-domestic buildings have increase by
6% in the period 2007–2015. The report suggests that “the current policy
framework is not generating sustained emission reductions and that a
transformational change is needed for non-residential buildings to make
the necessary contribution to meeting future carbon budgets.” One of the
main barriers to reducing energy consumption and carbon emissions
while delivering thermal comfort in theworking environment is the un-
predictable behaviour of the occupants. Numerous studies show that
users prefer buildings with facades with which they can interact to
fully serviced ofﬁces with sealed windows. However, the ability to
change the internal environmental conditions does bear a risk of
compromising the energy performance of the building. This is true inTable 3
Incremental effects of email interventions across study buildings.
From To % changea p-Valueb
Phase j Phase j+ 1 (1) (2)
Building 1
PRE GM −0.424 0.006
GM LM −0.284 0.003
LM PM 0.054 0.622
PM POST −0.038 0.837
Building 2 & 3
PRE LM −0.345 0.005
LM PM −0.09 0.472
PM POST −0.044 0.754
Building 4
PRE PM −0.499 0.026
PM POST 0.007 0.961
a Computed as the difference of the ratio (βj/αj) over two consecutive phases using
coefﬁcients in Table 2. e.g. (−0.088/0.207)− (−0.00/0.137) =−0.424.
b p-Value of a non-linear Walt test of the null hypothesis that the ratio (βj/αj) is the
same over two consecutive phases.particular in an ofﬁce environment, because there are no ﬁnancial in-
centives for the occupant to operate the façade in the same energy efﬁ-
cient manner as they would do in their own home. In addition, because
appliances and machines are often shared by multiple employees, in-
centives for saving energy may be greatly diminished as users may
feel that the problem is out of their control (Carrico and Riemer, 2011).
This paper investigates the effects of behavioural interventions in
ofﬁce buildingswith the aim of informing building designers, managers,
energy consultants and social scientists on the effectiveness of a low-
cost, easy-to-implement interventions aimed at reducing energy
waste and the consequent carbon emissions in a contextwhere individ-
uals do not have direct ﬁnancial gains. The interventions consist of three
types of emails with different information content ranging from a
generic environmental appeal to person speciﬁc feedback. Our results
show that these interventions are effective in promoting energy savings
in ofﬁce buildings. We also ﬁnd that the impact of the treatment is
stronger when the recipients are given information about an environ-
ment they can identify with or when their behaviour is compared to
that of their peers. Our study conﬁrms that social norms are potent
drivers not only in experimental settings, where norm salience can be
easily prioritized (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004), but also in a real
working environment. This study shows that improved energy-saving
behaviour is still observed some weeks after the interventions are
discontinued. This result seems to contradict the idea that treatments
simply act as temporary “cues”which are easily forgotten by recipients.
An important contribution of future works on energy conservation
would be to monitor the effects of interventions over longer periods of
time to understand whether such interventions can effectively create
permanent pro-environmental habits.
A number of factors discussed in the economics and psychology
literature can explain the effectiveness of our intervention. First, promo-
tive behavioural change ismore effectivewhen people are unaware that
their behaviour can signiﬁcantly contribute to environmental problems
(Abrahamse et al., 2005). In a survey we conducted one year before the
beginning of this study, we found that the vast majority of the respon-
dents did not associate “open” windows with wider energy waste, an
information deﬁcit that our intervention could easily address. Second,
interventions are known to be more effective when they are easy-to-
implement and well-tuned to change relevant behaviour (Steg and
Vlek, 2009), which is clearly the case for our request to close the
window. Thirdly, our emails provide highly personalized and speciﬁc
information to the participants and previous studies have found that
tailored information produces greater reduction in energy usage
compared to aggregate feedback (Abrahamse et al., 2005).
Our results suggest that there is a clear economic incentive for the
organizations to implement a simple intervention such as the one we
implement here. Our calculations suggest that an institution like the
University of Southampton can reduce the energy bill by more than
£40,000 per year by implementing a conservation program that costs
a fraction of this amount. In this respect, the fact that we still ﬁnd a
positive, but lower impact over time suggests that it may be advisable
to have an intense information campaign at the beginning of the
heating season to facilitate the formation of energy conservation habits,
and reduce (but not discontinue) interventions after this has
happened.
One important concern iswhether ourﬁndings can be generalized to
other working environments. Although most of our occupants have a
higher educational level than the population at large, it should be
noted that our intervention is very easy to understand and to imple-
ment. Moreover, there are good reasons to believe that the social effects
of behavioural interventions can be greater than those observed in this
and other studies as eco-friendly habits can be handed down to future
building occupants and transferred to other spaces in an everlasting,
virtuous cycle. Investigating how people develop these habits and the
extent to which these can generate positive spillovers will be a very
interesting direction for future research.
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Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.eneco.2018.07.008.
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